Contribution of this paper is twofold: First we introduce weaknesses of two Mix-nets claimed to be robust in the literature. Since such flaws are due to their weak security definitions, we then present a stronger security definition by regarding a Mix-net as a batch decryption algorithm of a CCA secure public-key encryption scheme. We show two concrete attacks on the schemes proposed in [1] and [2] . The scheme in [1] loses anonymity in the presence of a malicious user even though all servers are honest. The scheme in [2] also loses anonymity through the collaboration of a malicious user and the first server. In the later case the user can identify the plaintext sent from the targeted user by invoking two mix sessions at the risk of the colluding server receiving an accusation. We also point out that in a certain case, anonymity is violated solely by the user without colluding to any server. Heuristic repairs are provided for both schemes.
Introduction
Mix-net [3] is a central tool for many electronic voting systems. It establishes an anonymous channel between the voters and the ballot box. Intensive research has been done to realize a robust Mix-net that withstands the malicious behavior of servers and users. While many papers present publicly verifiable Mix-nets [4] - [8] , an interesting attempt of [9] introduces a privately convincing Mix-net where only the mix-servers can convince themselves of correctness. This kind of Mix-net provides better efficiency in exchange for this limitation. Although the particular construction has been attacked [10] , the same approach is taken by several latest schemes such as [1] . Another interesting attempt is described in [2] where the processing is very fast as long as the servers are honest. If a malfunctioning server is detected, the input data is processed by a full-fledged (and thus slow) robust Mix-net. Although one has to implement both types of Mix-net, such optimistic construction has a certain practical value. This paper elaborates the work presented in [11] . We show some weaknesses in the optimistic Mix-nets presented in [1] and [2] (referred as JJ01 and GZ + 02, respectively). In particular, it is shown that JJ01 can lose anonymity in the presence of a malicious user even though all servers are honest. For GZ + 02, we show that a malicious user collud- † † The author is with Information & Systems, Institute of Industrial Science, the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, 153-8505 Japan.
a) E-mail: abe.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a. 1.99 ing with the first mix-server can break anonymity at the risk of having the server accused. We also point out that in a certain case, a malicious user can solely mount an attack to trace a specific message at the cost of receiving accusation to himself. Our attack against GZ + 02 is also introduced independently by [12] , which includes other subtle attacks.
Since both JJ01 and GZ + 02 have been considered as secure with regard to particular definitions of security, the presence of the practical attacks means that the definitions must be re-considered. We present a security definition in which a Mix-net is considered as a batch decryption algorithm of a CCA secure public-key encryption scheme. The definition of anonymity is slightly but essentially augmented from that in [11] .
Attack on JJ01

Review
JJ01 is based on hybrid encryption with a message authentication code (MAC) that assures the integrity of the internal results. The Mix-net consists of n mix-servers and one additional server located at the tail of the sequence of servers. The additional server is actually simulated by the servers in a distributed manner. The role of this simulated server is decryption only (it does not shuffle the results).
By using the key-scheduling technique of [13] , each user shares symmetric encryption key k i with server i. This is done by sending server i a hint, say y i−1 , through the previous servers. That is, the user sends y 0 (= g ρ ) to the first server and it is then randomized and passed to the second server as y 1 . This procedure is continued to the last server. Please refer to [13] for details but we stress that this key-scheduling is done in a deterministic way and every symmetric-key k i is determined from just y 0 (and the public-keys of servers that determine the randomness used for randomizing y 0 ). It is also important to note that the key-scheduling allows these symmetric-keys to be verifiably shared among the servers and so ensure robustness. In JJ01, server i derives a MAC-key, say z i , from the same hint y i . Using symmetric encryption E and message authentication code MAC, message m is encrypted by computing
where SID is a session identifier uniquely assigned to each
Copyright c 2006 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers execution of Mix-net probably provided by the Mix-net or determined by system environment such as current date. The ciphertext is a triple (c 0 , µ 0 , y 0 ). Mix-net decrypts each ciphertext as follows. Let L 0 be the list of N ciphertexts given to the first server. Similarly, let L i−1 be the input to server i given from server i − 1.
= MAC z i+1 (c i SID), then decrypts c i by using symmetrickey k i+1 to obtain (c i+1 µ i+1 ). The triple (c i+1 , u i+1 , y i+1 ) is the result of internal decryption. The results are randomly ordered in list L i+1 and given to the next server. Now, if the MAC verification fails, the server claims so by publishing MAC-key z i+1 . (In fact, it is verifiably reconstructed by the rest of servers. For simplicity, we assume that servers honestly publish the correct keys by themselves. The same is true hereafter.) If the MAC is really wrong, it might have been caused by the previous server i. Hence server i proves its honesty by publishing corresponding encryption-key k i and the corresponding input ciphertext (c i+1 , u i+1 , y i+1 ). If key k i does not correctly decrypt c i+1 into c i+1 , u i+1 , the server i is disqualified. Otherwise, it continues until all previous servers prove their honesty in the same way. If this cycle reaches the first server, the user who has posted the original ciphertext is disqualified. One important observation in this disqualification process is that the MACkey z i+1 and encryption-key k i is revealed in public. Our attack abuses this information leakage.
Attack
0 be an input ciphertext for session SID = 0 posted by the targeted user. The purpose of the adversary is to identify the plaintext embedded in C. For this, it is sufficient to distinguish internal ciphertext C n = (c n , µ n , y n ) that corresponds to C 0 among the ciphertexts in L 0 n . (Remember that the simulated server at the tail does not shuffle its inputs.) The attack proceeds as follows.
-Given C 0 , the adversary (a user who can post a ciphertext to the same Mix) composesC 0 = (c 0 ,μ 0 , y 0 ) wherẽ µ 0 is a random string that looks like a MAC.C 0 is sent to the Mix at new session SID = 1. -Server 1 rejectsC 0 with high probability since MAC µ 0 is wrong. To show that it is really wrong, server 1 publishes MAC-key z 1 derived from y 0 , which is the correct MAC-key used for computing µ 0 . -By using this z 1 , the adversary re-computesμ 0 asμ 0 = MAC z 1 (c 0 2) and sendsC 1 = (c 0 ,μ 0 , y 0 ) to the Mix at SID = 2. is the output of server 1 in session 0. Thus, by seeing which one is rejected, the adversary can successfully trace the target ciphertext shuffled by server 1.) -To prove honesty, server 1 publishes symmetric-key k 1 with regard to the rejected ciphertext. By back-tracing the process, the bad user is eventually found and his input ciphertext is removed from the rest of the process. -Up to this point, the adversary has obtained (z 1 , k 1 , z 2 ).
By using these keys, he computesC 2 = (c 0 ,μ 0 , y 0 ) wherẽ
, and
ThenC 2 is posted to the Mix-net at SID = 3. -In session 3, the second server outputs (c 2 , µ 2 , y 2 ) which will be rejected by the third server. However, the adversary now successfully identifies the target ci-
2 in the original session, and obtains k 2 and z 3 .
-It is now easy to see that, by repeating this procedure for up to session n+1, the adversary can eventually
n that corresponds to C 0 . Observe that the adversary can mount this attack by himself if he is allowed to join to n + 1 sessions. Even if a disqualified user is excluded from all subsequent sessions, n + 1 colluding users are sufficient for the attack to be successful.
Heuristic Repair
A trivial repair is to hide symmetric-keys by using zeroknowledge proofs in the accusation procedure. However, general zero-knowledge proofs for correct symmetricdecryption and MAC is unacceptably costly in computation and communication.
A more practical repair would be to force every user to prove in zero-knowledge that he knows ρ of y 0 = g ρ . For efficiency, the zero-knowledge proof will be replaced with a Schnorr signature with public-key y 0 and private-key ρ. The security of this variant can be argued in the generic model combined with random oracle model [14] . We note that, as well as the original scheme, the repaired scheme allows a user and the first server cooperatively change the content of the ciphertext sent from the user after the mix processing is started. As discussed in JJ01, such an act may not seriously impact the security in some applications, but it does not meet our strong security definition in Sect. 4.
Attack on GZ
+ 02
where E(·) is also ElGamal encryption. Namely, the ciphertext C doubly envelopes message m with ElGamal encryption adding a hash value to the message of the outer encryption.
The servers first sequentially re-encrypt and shuffle the input ciphertexts. The outer layer encryption of the shuffled ciphertexts are then decrypted by the collaboration of a quorum of servers. If all the resulting triples, {(M, G, H)}, contain a consistent hash value, the inner ElGamal encryption, (M, G), is decrypted by the quorum of servers to obtain the plaintext.
In the re-encryption and shuffling stage, each mixserver has to prove correctness. This is done by proving that the embedded plaintexts are unchanged except for the order. In general such a proof is costly in computation. In GZ + 02, the servers only prove that the product of all plaintexts are unchanged. It results in a very efficient zero-knowledge proof that abuses the multiplicative property of ElGamal ciphertext. Though it is easy for a cheating server to modify embedded plaintexts without affecting to their product, such an attempt results in an inconsistent hash value H and eventually the malicious sever is detected. (Once such an actively deviating server is detected, the remaining servers cooperatively remove the outer-layer encryption from the input ciphertexts and input the inner layer ElGamal ciphertexts to a full-fledged robust Mix-net such as [7] .)
Observe
that an input ciphertext C = (E(M), E(G), E(H))
is malleable since it is just a triple of ElGamal encryption. Hence, in order to prevent copied and re-encrypted ciphertexts from being posted, the user has to prove his knowledge about the embedded message (M, G, H) in a zero-knowledge manner. In fact, the proof and encryption are done at the same time by using so called Signed El-
Gamal encryption for computing each of E(M), E(G), E(H)
so that finding the correct ciphertext implies the knowledge of (M, G, H). In this way, the outer encryption becomes non-malleable in the generic model and the random oracle model. In the next section, however, we show that this nonmalleable encryption (and its original interactive version) is not secure enough in the Mix-net scenario because it does not guarantee the knowledge of the inner message m.
Attack 1
Suppose that the adversary corrupts a user and the first mixserver. Let C = (E(M), E(G), E(H)) be the target input ciphertext to trace. The attack proceeds as follows.
The corrupt user creates a ciphertext
correctly from an arbitrary message and sends it to the Mix-net. Note that even if the first server is removed, the Mix-net remains functional in subsequent sessions as long as a quorum of servers are honest. In particular, since re-encryption can be done without knowing the secret-key, anyone can work as a server in the re-encryption and shuffling stage instead of the disqualified server.
Attack 2
In GZ + 02, it is noted that one can omit the proof of knowledge about r 3 to reduce the computational cost. However, we point out that such an attempt leads to another attack that can be mounted solely by a malicious user.
Let C = (E(M), E(G), E(H)) be the target ciphertext to trace. The attacker correctly computes ElGamal ciphertext (M , G ) of arbitrary message m . He then computes the input ciphertext C = (E(M ), E(G ), E(H)) whose third part is the same as that of C (or, it can be re-encrypted as E(H)). Now, assume that the proof about the knowledge about H is omitted. This means that C will be accepted as the attacker can correctly show proof of knowledge about m since he indeed knows m relative to (M, G). As the process proceeds, (M , G , H) will come out and be rejected. At this point, the adversary can identify target ciphertext (M, G, H) by using H observed in the rejected ciphertext. Although the input from the attacker will be ejected from this process, no servers are in collusion and the process goes ahead. Hence the target ciphertext (M, G, H) will be decrypted by the collaboration of servers without being shuffled, and the plaintext will be straightforwardly exposed. This attack shows the importance of making the entire input non-malleable.
Heuristic Repair
A straightforward repair is to force the user to prove his knowledge about inner message m. Let C = (E(M), E(G), E(H)) be an input ciphertext where:
Proving one's knowledge about (r 0 , r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) in the above representation is sufficient to show his knowledge about message m. The proof can be done by combining two Schnorr proofs of knowledge and a proof of representation as follows.
The output is (c, z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), which is verified by computing
and checking c
. This modification is quite costly in terms of computation. If desired, a straightforward modification allows one to batch verify the predicate to minimize the computational impact in trade-off against communication cost. We also remark that this repair only prevents so called relation attacks [15] mounted by malicious users. Indeed, due to [12] , it remains vulnerable against corruption of the last mix-server. Hence it does not provide the strong security defined in the next section.
Security of Mix-net
Among several definitions possible, we present one that bears resemblance to the security notion of ordinary publickey encryption scheme. Observe that Mix-net can be seen as a batch decryption function accompanied by random permutation performed by several servers. Including keygeneration and encryption function, a Mix-net scheme could be considered as a public-key encryption scheme featuring batch decryption and random permutation. Hence it is reasonable to consider security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, which is the strongest notion of security for a public-key encryption scheme. Anonymity will be defined by comparing an ideal shuffling system and a real mix-net protocol in the presence of an adversary conducting adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
Model
Mix-net:
The ideal system is illustrated in Fig. 1 ; Each user is connected to a tamper-proof shuffling-box that takes a list of messages, say (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) from each user via a physically secure (i.e., untappable) channel, and outputs a list of randomly re-ordered messages, say (υ 1 , . . . , υ n ). We refer to such a system as the ideal shuffling-box. We then represent a practical Mix-net as a system that mimics "private channel + shuffling-box" over a public network as outlined in Fig. 2 .
Let [n] denote {1, . . . , n}. Let Π n denote a set of permutation over [n] . Syntactical definition of Mix-net is as follows.
Definition 1 (Mix-net)
Mix-net is a triple, (G mix , E mix , M), where: -G mix is a probabilistic algorithm that takes security parameter κ, and access structure Γ for m party, and outputs a public encryption key, say y, and a set of private decryption keys x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ). The public-key set may contain a set of local public-keys (y 1 , . . . , y m ) that corresponds to x. Publickey y determines message space M y . -E mix is a probabilistic algorithm that takes message µ ∈ M y and public-key y and outputs a ciphertext C. We require that, for any µ and
denotes an output of function E mix y (µ) and also denotes the distribution of the outputs according to the randomness used in the function. Such notation will be used for conciseness hereafter.) -M is a set of probabilistic polynomial-time interactive Turing machines, say {M 1 , . . . , M m }, called mix-servers. Each mix-server is given a list of ciphertexts, {C 1 , . . . , C n } and public-key y as a common input. Private-key x i is a private input. Mix-servers interact with each other and output a list of messages (υ 1 , . . . , υ n ) on their output tape. It is required that there exists permutation π ∈ Π n such that υ π(i) = µ i if there exists µ i ∈ M y such that
Note that E mix must be probabilistic. Otherwise, one can easily find the correspondence between resulting plaintexts and input ciphertexts. For convenience, we define the decryption algorithm D mix that corresponds to E mix in such a way
Note that the decryption algorithm corresponds to M when M consist of a single mixserver and only one input ciphertext is given.
Additional information, such as the maximum number of input ciphertexts, may be provided to each algorithm. Typically, G mix is performed by Mix-servers themselves so that each piece of the private key is known only to the relevant server according to the access structure. In a narrow sense, Mix-net refers to Mix-servers or their algorithms. According to the standard scenario, each input ciphertext is created by an entity called a user. Let U i denote a user who has message µ i and posts a ciphertext, say C i . By U we denote a set of users, U = {U 1 , . . . , U n }.
Communication Channel: For simplicity, we assume that all communication between all M and all U is done via a bulletin board, denoted by BB. The bulletin board BB is a public memory where everyone can read and write in an authenticated manner but no one can erase or overwrite any information once written. This is equivalent to a complete, synchronous, authenticated network with broadcast function.
Adversary: We follow the central adversary model unless otherwise noted. There is a polynomial-time adversary A that can corrupt subsets of mix-servers and users. We say that A is (t u , t m )-limited if it corrupts up to t u users and t m servers. (More general and detailed notation will specify the collusion structure among the servers and users. We restrict ourselves to this simple notation.) Let U A and M A denote the set of corrupt users and servers, respectively. Similarly, let U H and M H denote honest users and servers, respectively. When the adversary is supposed to be active, it can control U A and M A in an arbitrary way to break the anonymity of U H or to lead M H to issue an incorrect output. On the other hand, if the adversary is considered to be passive, it can obtain only the internal state of the corrupt players. Adaptive adversary decides the target of corruption at an arbitrary time while static adversary is restricted to setting the target before any protocol (including the key generation protocol) starts.
Security Definitions
Let L y denote a language such that
with regard to (y, x) generated by G mix (1 κ ).
Definition 2 (Correctness) (υ 1 , . . . , υ n ) is correct with regard to y and (C 1 , . . . , C n ) if
Definition 3 (Anonymity) Let A be an adversary that plays the following game. At any moment of the game, A is allowed to corrupt up to t u users and t m servers. Once corrupted, the user or the server is thoroughly controlled by A.
. Public-key y and each shared decryption key x i is given to M i .
2.
A is given y and allowed to invoke M an arbitrary number of times for arbitrary chosen input ciphertexts (i.e., A can use M as a decryption oracle).
3.
A outputs L C = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) that is a list of messages chosen from M y .
4. Choose a permutation, π ← Π n . Each U i is given µ π(i) privately and outputs ciphertext C i . If U i is corrupted and outputs nothing, let C i be an empty string. Let C = {C 1 , . . . , C n }.
5. M performs mix processing on C.
6.
A is again allowed to invoke M an arbitrary number of times for arbitrarily chosen input ciphertexts.
7.
A outputs (i , j ) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n}. The restriction is that U i U A (i.e., U i has never been corrupted).
A wins the game if π(i ) = j . We say that Mix-net is (t u , t m )-anonymous if any (t u , t m )-limited polynomial-time adaptive and active adversary A wins the above game with probability at most 1 n−t u + where is negligible in κ. Probability is taken over the coin flips of G mix , U, M, A and the choice of π.
Remark 1 In step 5, the mix protocol may be disrupted by corrupt servers. (Note that we do not consider robustness here. Hence the mix-servers may abort the process.) However, it is irrelevant whether the mix is completed or not in this step. If the mix-servers abort, the adversary has to continue possibly without seeing the correct output about the challenge inputs.
Remark 2
Notice that the adversary can input ciphertexts in C to mix-servers in step 6. (This is an essential difference from the definition in [11] where such re-submitted inputs are supposed to be excluded by the rule of the attack game.) If such inputs are accepted and processed, the adversary clearly wins the game. Accordingly, it is the servers' task to reject re-submitted ciphertexts. When mix-servers are stateful, it can be achieved by simply check the freshness of the inputs. For stateless servers, a common approach would be to extend the encryption algorithm so that it binds every ciphertext to a public fresh nonce (possibly chosen by the adversary), which is sometimes called label or tag [16] , [17] and give the same nonce to the mix-servers as an auxiliary input. Then the adversary is restricted to choose fresh nonces.
This is an essential difference from the definition of chosen-ciphertext attacks for ordinary public-key encryption, where the adversary is restricted not to input the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle. Since public-key encryption is a relatively low-level primitive, freshness of the inputs are often verified by the upper-level protocols.
On the other hand, freshness is of a great concern in typical applications of mix-net. Since we do not know a generic black-box method that strengthen a given mix-net against the re-use of ciphertexts, we believe that it is useful to concern the freshness of the inputs at this level.
Remark 3
With only one mix-server (m = 1) and two users (n = 2), the above definition is almost the same as that of indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. (Except for the freshness issue mentioned in remark 2. When nonce is used as suggested, a corresponding security notion is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks for labeled public-key encryption schemes as described in [16] .) Although two ciphertexts are given to the adversary in this case, it is known that such a matching problem is equivalent to a decision problem where only one ciphertext is given to the adversary [18] .
Remark 4
An adversary who plays the analogue anonymity game with the ideal shuffling box has inning probability of
Remark 5 Probability can also depend on the number of inputs. A scheme may efficiently preserve anonymity only for large number of inputs.
Next we define robustness. Intuitively, Mix-net is robust if it always outputs correct results in the presence of corrupt servers and users up to some limit.
Definition 4 (Robustness)
A Mix-net is robust against (t u , t m )-limited adaptive and active adversary if, for any of such polynomial-time adversary, M H terminates in polynomial-time with a correct output with overwhelming probability in κ. The probability is taken over the coin flips of A, U, and M.
Definition 4 does not address anonymity, though it can be made to include anonymity at the same time. Our separate definitions are useful in describing Mix-nets with different boundary parameters. For instance, some Mix-nets may output correct results but lose anonymity with some parameter settings. (One may desire to have correct output after detecting malicious players even though anonymity is lost. Such a treatment would be needed for optimistic schemes.)
Definitions for more restricted (i.e. static and/or passive) adversaries can be obtained by appropriately restricting the adversary in definition 3 and 4.
One can also define verifiability by adding verifier to the model. A Mix-net provides public verifiability when the verifier can be convinced of the correctness of the output. To capture this intuition, we need to modify the syntax of mix-servers so that they interact with the verifier. Then the verifier outputs 1 only if the output of mix-servers is correct.
Conclusion
These attacks remind us that the input ciphertext must be non-malleable against chosen ciphertext attacks. Since the attacked schemes have been proven secure with regard to some security definitions, the presence of concrete attacks means that stronger definitions are needed. We have presented security definitions based on the thought that Mix-net is a form of batch decryption and hence should provide indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
An immediate open problem is to show existence of a natural scheme that is secure with regard to the proposed security definition. Recent progress of this research field includes a definition of Mix-net in the UC framework [19] , [20] . Since the indistinguishability-based definition of public-key encryption is known to be equivalent to a UCbased definition (against static adversaries), it is an interesting problem to see whether the definition proposed in this paper is equivalent to the one defined in the UC framework.
